According to a 'radical orphanage' approach, non-restrictive relative clauses are not part of the syntactic representation of the sentence that contains them. It is an appealing view, and seems to capture some important properties of non-restrictive relative clauses. This paper aims to show that the appeal of such approaches is illusory, focusing mainly on empirical shortcomings. It also outlines an empirically superior 'syntactically integrated' account.
Introduction
According to a 'radical orphanage' (RO) approach, non-restrictive ('appositive') relative clauses are not part of the syntactic representation of the sentence that contains them (e.g. Fabb, 1990; Espinal, 1991; Burton-Roberts, 1999; Peterson, 2004) . It is an appealing view. Building on the RO approach to parentheticals expressions first proposed in Haegemann (1988) , it seems to capture some important properties of non-restrictive relative clauses (NRCs), and offers an interesting account of the various grammatical differences between NRCs and restrictive relatives (RRCs). This paper aims to show that the appeal of such an approach is illusory, focusing mainly on empirical shortcomings, based partly on data which is well-known, but often ignored, and partly on data which has not previously been considered. It also outlines an empirically superior 'syntactically integrated' account. An important side effect of the discussion will be to debunk a number of myths about English NRCs which have considerable currency in the literature.
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The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides background, giving an overview of relevant phenomena and existing analyses. Section 3 introduces the RO approach. Section 4 sets out its shortcomings in relation to NRCs. Section 5 outlines an empirically superior 'syntactically integrated' analysis. Section 6 provides a brief summary and conclusion.
Background
A basic example of an NRC is given in (1a). It is to be contrasted with a RRC such as (1b).
(1) a. Harrods sells muffins, which the Queen serves at tea time. [NRC] b. Harrods sells muffins which the Queen serves at tea time.
[RRC]
The most obvious difference is phonological: the NRC is a distinct intonation unit, separated from the clause that appears to contain it (what I will call the 'matrix' or 'host' clause) by some sort of intonation break in speech, and by commas writing. RRCs are normally integrated intonationally (and appear without commas in modern English).
2 Semantically, NRCs are interpreted as simply adding information about a phrase whose interpretation is otherwise not affected -the NP muffins in (1a)) -what I will call the 'antecedent' (more pedantically, one would talk about the antecedent of the relative pronoun in the NRC). For this 1 The discussion will be entirely restricted to English. I should also stress that the critique is limited to the radical orphanage approach as applied to NRCs, I take no stand on its applicability to other phenomena (e.g. genuine parentheticals).
2 The phonological separation of NRCs can also be seen in the way they appear not to contribute to phonological 'heaviness':
(1) (i) *I believe to be clever Sandy.
(ii) I believe to be clever anyone who has read both PTQ and Aspects.
[RRC] (iii) *I believe to be clever Sandy, who has read both PTQ and Aspects.
[NRC] Kaisse (1981) notes some other phonological differences between NRCs and RRCs.
reason NRCs can often be eliminated and have their content expressed by a separate clause. There is very little difference in meaning between (1a) and the following:
(2) a. Harrods sells muffins. The Queen serves them at tea time.
b. Harrods sells muffins. The Queen serves muffins at tea time.
RRCs, on the other hand, are interpreted 'intersectively' -as restricting the denotation of the associated noun. So, in (1b), the object of sell is understood to be the intersection of muffins and things the Queen serves at tea time.
Presumably because of this intersective interpretation, RRCs are not possible with proper names, in their normal interpretation.
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(3) a. I've never spoken to Kim, who plays poker.
[NRC] b. *I've never spoken to Kim who plays poker.
As another effect of this semantics, RRCs often implicitly introduce a 'contrast set' into the domain of discourse, which can be accessed anaphorically by an expression like some others, as in (4a). This is not usually possible with an NRC: (4) a. Harrods sells muffins which the Queen serves at tea time, and some others that are not very good.
[RRC] b. # Harrods sells muffins, which the Queen serves at tea time, and some others that are not very good.
[NRC]
Notice (4b) is anomalous in the same way as the following, plausibly for the same reason:
(5) # Harrods sells muffins, and some others that are not very good.
In many cases, in particular, when the antecedent is associated with a definite set of some kind, an NRC will produce a 'totality' interpretation. Thus, the interpretation of (6a) is that the neighbour looks after all Kim's pets; (6b) is not interpreted in this way (Sells, 1986) .
(6) a. Kim has three pets, which a neighbour looks after.
[NRC] b. Kim has three pets which a neighbour looks after.
Syntactically, NRCs are more limited that RRCs: NRCs are required to be finite, and must contain a Wh-relative pronoun, so non-finite NRCs, and those introduced by that or zero are not allowed. 4 Notice that the following are ungrammatical when the relative clause is taken as an NRC, but are fine if the commas are removed and they are interpreted restrictively.
(7) a. *Harrods sells muffins, that the Queen serves at tea time. b. *Harrods sells muffins, the Queen serves at tea time. c. *Harrods sells muffins, for the Queen to serve at tea time. d. *Harrods sells muffins, to serve at tea time.
Moreover, NRCs are compatible with a much wider range of antecedents than RRCs. Whereas RRCs attach only to nominals, NRCs are compatible with a wide range of phrases. (8) contains examples (the corresponding RRCs, which can be produced by removing commas and replacing which by zero or that, are unacceptable).
(8) a. Kim put it on the table, which is a good place. (PP: on the table) b. Kim was really nice, which I didn't think she would be. (AP:
really nice) c. Kim is a sceptic, which I am not. (predicative NP: a skeptic) d. Kim won the race, which I didn't think she could. (VP: win the race) e. Kim won the race, which was a relief. (S: Kim won the race).
One can make intuitive sense of a great deal of this, and much other data about the interpretation of NRCs if one makes two plausible and relatively uncontroversial assumptions: (a) NRCs are interpreted as independent sentences -so their content is somehow separate from that of the matrix clause; and (b) relative pronouns in NRCs are essentially 'normal' anaphoric pronouns.
For example, the wide range of possible antecedents for NRCs is what one would expect if the non-restrictive relative pronouns (NRPs) are 4 It is conventional wisdom that NRCs must be finite but there are some at least potential counter-examples. The following involves an imperative NRC, which is apparently non-finite:
(i) And on the other side of the door, which be careful to close, young man, you will find the fabled treasure. Optative NRCs are also possible:
(ii) But what if the Queen, whom (may) the Lord preserve, should find out? Assuming modals such as may or let are finite, then the alternative with may is unproblematic. However, the alternative without may is presumably non-finite. Such examples sound, to my ears, somewhat archaic, but hardly ungrammatical (compared to examples like (7c,d) which are totally out).
normal anaphoric pronouns. Comparison of the following with the corresponding examples in (8) gives some idea (allowance must be made for the fact that no single normal pronoun has quite the same range as which, so some paraphrases require 'null anaphora'):
(9) a. Kim put it on the table. It is a good place.
b. Kim was really nice. I didn't think she would be ∆. c. Kim is a sceptic. I am not ∆. d. Kim won the race, I didn't think she could (do it/so). e. Kim won the race. It was a relief.
Moreover, as with normal anaphora, the antecedent of an NRP need not be a linguistic constituent: 'split' antecedents, as well as ones constructed from the preceding context are possible:
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(10) a. The Queen serves muffins, and Prince Charles serves scones, which they buy at Harrods. b. He was no novelist, whose first virtue is the exact understanding of the limits traced by the reality of his time to the play of his invention. [Joseph Conrad, A Personal Record ] c. The cups -not having been used, perhaps, since Hepzibah's youth -had contracted no small burden of dust, which Phoebe washed away with so much care and delicacy as to satisfy even the proprietor of this invaluable china. [House of Seven Gables, Nathaniel Hawthorne] d. . . . data are whatever a researcher can make useful for meeting his/her research objectives, aims or problems, which is not to say that just any old thing will do. [HPU/0313] In (10a) the antecedent of which is muffins and scones (just as the antecedent of they is the Queen and Prince Charles). In (10b) the antecedent of the relative pronoun is 'novelists' (not no novelist), in (10c) it is '(a) burden of dust', not no small burden of dust. In (10d) the antecedent is the content of the entire preceding statement.
Taking NRPs to be anaphoric also explains the contrast in (11), first pointed out by Vergnaud (1974) . Though parts of idioms like take advantage allow modification by RRCs, they cannot be the antecedents of NRCs.
5 The annotation on example (10d) means it is from the British National Corpus (BNC), file HPU, around line 313. In what follows, and in the Appendix, all examples annotated in this way are from the BNC.
(11) a. *The headway, which the students made last week, was amazing.
[RRC] b. The headway which the students made last week was amazing.
This is easily explained if NRPs are essentially anaphoric pronouns, because such idiom parts cannot be the antecedents of normal anaphoric pronouns:
(12) *The headway was amazing. The students made it last week.
The assumption that NRCs are interpreted as independent clauses, with content separate from the matrix clause, explains a number phenomena.
Taken together with the assumption that NRPs are normal pronouns, it explains the behaviour of NRCs with respect to 'contrast sets' and totality interpretations. The following are anomalous in the same way as the corresponding NRCs above (e.g. (4b)). Notice that (13b) has the same 'totality' interpretation observed in (6b).
(13) a. Harrods sells muffins, The Queen serves them. #The others. . . b. Kim has three pets. A neighbour looks after them. #The others. . .
As noted by McCawley (1988) , VP-internal NRCs do not seem to form part of the VP for the purpose of VP-Ellipsis. Thus, where an RRC example such as (14a) is ambiguous (the elided VP may be interpreted as saying that Sandy recognised the man who took Kim's wallet, or the man who took Sandy's wallet), the corresponding NRC (14b) is unambiguous, the second conjunct simply says that Sandy recognised the man. It is as if the NRC is simply absent for the purpose of resolving VP Ellipsisas it would be if was actually a separate sentence.
(14) a. Kim recognised the man who took her wallet, and so did Sandy.
[RRC] b. Kim recognised the man, who took her wallet, and so did Sandy.
Similarly, it seems that the content of an NRC is outside the scope of sentence negation. Thus, whereas one can focus sentence negation inside an RRC, as in (15a) it is not possible to do this with an NRC, as in (15b) (Jackendoff, 1977) .
(15) a. We didn't talk to the man who married SUSAN.
b. *We didn't talk to the man, who married SUSAN.
This may also explain the following contrast. Compare especially the NRCs in (16b) and (17b):
(16) a. Sam owns a car that has a broken windscreen.
[RRC] b. Sam owns a car, which has a broken windscreen.
(17) a. Sam doesn't own a car that has a broken windscreen.
[RRC] b. *Sam doesn't own a car, which has a broken windscreen. [NRC] There is no sensible interpretation for (17b). This is natural if the NRC is outside the scope of sentence negation (and the relative pronoun is really pronominal), because it parallels the unacceptability of (18).
(18) *Sam doesn't own a car. It has a broken windscreen.
NRCs can also escape the scope of propositional verbs. Thus, (19b) has a reading where the proposition that linguists use the IPA forms no part of Kim's beliefs, but instead represents an assertion by the speaker. Similarly, (21) is overall a question, but contains an explicit performative in the NRC, and (22) is overall a request, but the NRC has the illocutionary force of a promise.
(21) Couldn't this offer, which I hereby reluctantly accept, have been made weeks ago? [NRC] (22) Could you possibly lend me your copy of Aspects, which I promise I'll return within the hour.
NRCs seem to be able to bear 'discourse relations' to their host clause. Burton- Roberts (1999) notes the following contrast:
(23) a. *John gets on best with those firms who therefore employ him frequently.
b. John gets on best with those firms, who therefore employ him frequently.
The relative clause in (23b) can stand in a 'consequence' relation to the host clause ('John gets on best with those firms'). This is not possible for the RRC. This is consistent with the NRC, but not the RRC, being an independent sentence of some kind.
Finally, NRCs cannot contain 'externally licensed' Negative Polarity Items (NPIs). Thus the downwards entailing quantifier no one licenses the NPI anything in (24a), but not in the corresponding NRC (24b). The interrogative operator in (25a)/(25b) shows the same contrast, as does sentence negation in (26a)/(26b). (24) (26) a. But of course, we didn't introduce the president to the guests that had any real criticisms.
[RRC] b. But of course, we didn't introduce the president to the guests, who had any real opinions.
These are not the only differences between NRCs and RRCs that have been claimed to exist. But they are the most important of the ones that bear scrutiny (the following section will point out some alleged differences which do not stand up to examination).
There are, broadly speaking, three approaches to the grammar of NRCs: 6 1. "Radical orphanage" (RO) analyses. According to these analyses, NRCs are not part of the syntactic structure of the matrix clause at all, at any level of syntactic representation (e.g. Safir, 1986; Fabb, 1990; Espinal, 1991; Burton-Roberts, 1999; Peterson, 2004) .
2. High Syntactic Attachment ('non-radical orphanage') analyses. According to these analyses NRCs are attached high, to the root S or even some higher node at some syntactic level(s), e.g. at Deep Structure, or LF (e.g. Ross, 1967; Emonds, 1979; McCawley, 1988) .
3. Syntactically Integrated ('NP-S') analyses. According to these analyses NRCs are syntactically part of the clause that appears to contain them -typically they are analysed as adjoined to the antecedent nominal (cf Figure 2 , below). (See, e.g. Jackendoff, 1977; Perzanowski, 1980; Kempson, 2003; Arnold, 2004 ).
I will have little more to say here about High Syntactic Attachment analyses here, except in passing and by implication, in the sense that much of the data that is problematic for RO analyses may also be problematic for such analyses, and arguments in favour of an integrated analysis may be per se arguments against them. In the next section I will flesh out the RO approach, and give an idea of how it can provide an account of the properties of NRCs.
Radical Orphanage Approaches
This section will introduce the main ideas of the RO approach, and sketch out how it can account for the key properties of NRCs. I will focus on the approach of Espinal (Espinal, 1991) , which gives what I think is the most explicit account of radical orphanage, and then discuss points of comparison with other approaches.
The key idea of Espinal's account of what she calls 'disjunct' constituents, including NRCs, is that the grammatical structure associated with a surface string consists of a number of separate trees on separate 'planes', or 'tiers', which are related only at the most superficial level (PF) and at the level of Conceptual Structure (CS). Restricting attention to NRCs, we have a picture like Figure 1 as the structure of (27). This should be contrasted with the sort of structure that would be assigned under a syntactically integrated approach, where the NRCs stand in much the same kind of relation to the rest of the matrix clauses as would RRCs (Figure 2 ). The only likely disagreement among syntactically integrated approaches relates to where relative clauses attach -e.g. Jackendoff (1977) suggests that NRCs attach to NP while RRCs attach to N', but e.g. Sag (1997) Figure 1 : A Radical Orphanage analysis of NRCs (Espinal, 1991 )
, who I knew,
, who I hadn't met, The planes have to intersect at the most superficial level, because of the need to produce a linear sequence of sounds. Their associated Conceptual Structures (CSs) must also be put together, because of the need to make some kind of coherent discourse which takes account of all linguistic material. However, the operations that combine elements from different planes at PF and CS are rather limited: essentially just concatenation. Thus, for example, NRCs are not intonationally integrated with the main clause, and their integration into CS is strictly limited, perhaps involving only what is required for the interpretation of independent sentences (e.g. establishing anaphoric relations). Beyond this limited combination at PF and CS the planes are entirely separate: as far as grammatical processes operating on the root sentence are concerned, NRCs simply do not exist (and similarly, from the NRC point of view the root sentence does not exist). This means that elements from one plane cannot stand in grammatical relations with, or interact in any grammatical way with, elements from another, at any grammatical level. Elements from one plane cannot, for example, stand in c-command relations with elements from another plane, cannot satisfy subcategorization requirements of elements from another plane (which would require them to be related at D-Structure), and cannot function as arguments of predicates or operators over elements of another plane (which would require them to be related at LF).
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In short, the idea is that interaction between elements from different tiers is minimal -essentially just what one would find between separate sentences.
The immediate intuitive appeal of an RO approach should be clear from this. The idea that NRCs, qua parentheticals, are essentially just separate sentences neatly captures a leading intuition about them. If they are not part of the grammatical structure of the clause it seems entirely natural that they should be set off phonologically, have a separate illocutionary force, escape sentence negation, disallow NPIs, and not play a role in VP-Ellipsis, etc. etc. It would also explain the obligatory presence of a relative pronoun in the NRC -roughly, the relative pronoun is required in the NRC in the same way and for the same reasons as a normal pronoun is required in an independent sentence. I have concentrated on Espinal's approach here because it seems to me the clearest and most worked out as regards formal detail. Among than separate sentences from any given plane, that is, the only integration is what one would expect given that they are part of the same discourse. However, for NRCs specifically, Espinal is prepared to allow that a 'commenting on' relation may be established; an NRC is taken as 'commenting on' -supplying information aboutthe antecedent of the relative pronoun (Espinal, 1991, :757) . She does not give any details -it might perhaps involve nothing more than establishing a referent for the relative pronoun, just as with normal cross-sentential anaphora.
9 As Espinal (1991, p739) puts it "Disjunct constituents do not seem to be attached to host clauses at any syntactic level of representation; their independence holds at least until the time their full interpretation is reached." Elsewhere, she states that the 'integration' level is one where "relevance of information being processed is evaluated and access to discourse information and to the visual environment allows argument places to be filled." (Espinal, 1991, 748) . In short, it is a 'non-linguistic' 'conceptual' level beyond grammatical processes.
the other proposals that are reasonably characterised as involving RO, Burton-Roberts (1999) is still more radical: discussing the details of this proposal would take us too far from the main theme, but the general idea is that though the representations of the host clause and NRC appear to be adjacent, the corresponding linguistic objects (i.e. the object of linguistic concern) are not related at all -so there is no grammatical relation between the NRC and its host. Peterson (2004) does not try to give a formal account of the relation, but is clear that he regards the NRC and its host as having totally separate grammatical structures, related only by cross-indexing at discourse levels (as he puts it, " [they] are not structurally linked any more than two consecutive sentences in a coherent discourse").
Similarly, Fabb (1990) 's formalisation might be different from Espinal's -he does not discuss the idea of separate tiers of representation and identifies the level of representation where NRCs and their hosts become related (specifically, where relative pronouns in NRCs are coindexed with their antecedents) with Safir's level of LF , a level of representation 'beyond' LF. It is possible that this level of representation might more resemble normal linguistic levels of representation (and so lack the structure of tiers presented by Espinal), but Fabb is very clear that his is an RO analysis, and in particular, that this level of representation is a 'discourse' level, beyond normal grammatical processes.
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In what follows the formal differences and differences of theoretical orientation between these approaches will not be important. The key point has been to make clarify the idea of radical orphanage, and show one way it could be realized. The common ground is that while NRCs and RRCs may be integrated at some level or levels, these are not grammatical levels in the sense of being the locus of grammatical processes. In short, there is no grammatical interaction between the NRC and its host clause.
Problems for RO Approaches
In this section I will present a large number of phenomena that appear problematic for RO approaches. I believe that, taken together, they entirely undermine the initial appeal of the approaches. For the purpose of discussion, it will be useful to divide the phenomena into a number of (partly overlapping) groups:
• Phenomena which suggest that NRCs differ from 'real' parentheticals (i.e. from what would be, from an RO perspective, clear cases of genuine orphans).
• Phenomena that suggest that NRCs and their antecedents form syntactic constituents, and that NRCs must therefore be syntactically integrated.
• Phenomena related to processes that seem to apply similarly to NRCs and RRCs, and which therefore suggest they involve similar (hence, by implication, integrated) structures.
• Other phenomena which appear similar in NRCs and RRCs (so underlining their similarity) but which suggest specifically that NRCs are grammatically related to the matrix clause (i.e. integrated).
For the most part, these phenomena raise two kinds of problem for RO analyses. The first is that they involve what are generally considered normal grammatical processes, and as such constitute prima facie counter-evidence to such analyses, because they indicate that NRCs are grammatically related to parts of the matrix clause, whereas according to RO analyses the only relations should be discourse relations. The second is that in many cases the phenomena are indicative of NRCs and RRCs standing in a similar relation to surrounding linguistic material. Of course, on an RO approach, the structures involved are very different. This means that even if an RO account of these phenomena can 4.1 be given, it will not be a unified account for NRCs and RRCs, and the evident parallels between RRCs and NRCs will be unexplained.
NRCs Are Not Parentheticals
A central plank of the RO analysis of NRCs is that NRCs (but not RRCs) are parentheticals, and that this explains the special properties of NRCs, in particular, the differences between NRCs and RRCs. There are two sorts of problem with this. First, the differences in 'parentheticality' between NRCs and RRCs are not as great as has been argued. Second, there are striking differences between NRCs and 'normal' parentheticals.
The most obvious difficulty with parentheticality as an explanation of the differences between NRC and RRCs is that restrictive relatives can be parenthetical, at least in the sense of being uttered 'in parenthesis' or having 'comma' intonation. The examples in (28) involve 'parenthetical' restrictive relatives: that-relatives in the case of (28a), two non-finite relatives in the case of (28b).
(28) a. There are no problems (that I'm aware of) with this proposal, or any of the others we are looking at today. b. He brought with him a book (to read) and a blanket (to sit on).
As evidence for the parentheticality of NRCs, it is often suggested that only NRCs can function as independent utterances (Burton- Roberts, 1999, e.g.) . This is simply not true. In (29) speaker B supplements speaker A's utterance with an NRC. In (30) speaker B supplements it with an RRC (a that relative). Both are equally good. (31) a. The senator told the public many obvious lies, as everyone now admits. b. The senator told the public many obvious lies, and everyone now admits it. c. The senator told the public many obvious lies, which everyone now admits.
However, the following examples show that whereas And-and Asparentheticals can occur inside their 'host' constituent (the constituent they modify semantically), NRCs must appear after their antecedents:
(32) a. The senator told the public, as everyone now admits, many obvious lies. b. The senator told the public, and everyone now admits it, many obvious lies. c. *The senator told the public, which everyone now admits, many obvious lies.
(33) a. The senator, as everyone now admits, told the public many obvious lies. b. The senator, and everyone now admits it, told the public many obvious lies. c. *The senator, which everyone now admits, told the public many obvious lies.
As-parentheticals can also precede their antecedents, but this is not possible for NRCs:
(34) As everyone now admits, that the world is round is obvious. (35) *Which everyone now admits, that the world is round is obvious.
One thing to notice is that these data are exactly what is predicted by a syntactically integrated analysis -they show NRCs right adjoining to, and hence following, their antecedents, just like RRCs.
In response to this problem, RO analyses typically resort to a stipulation that NRCs must be immediately follow their antecedents.
11 Unfortunately this stipulation is inadequate. In what follows we will see several 11 Espinal (1991, p752) notes that different kinds of parenthetical will be subject to different conditions, including "[a] requirement that nonrestrictive relative clauses must immediately follow their antecedents", and says that "Among the universal well-formedness conditions that seem to depend on the nature of the parenthetical is the requirement that nonrestrictive relative clauses must immediately follow their 4.2 examples of processes which can separate an NRC from its antecedent (the same processes, in fact, that can separate an RRC from nominal it modifies -as expected under an integrated analysis). 
Constituency
On an RO analysis, NRCs and their antecedents belong to separate 'tiers' of grammatical organisation, and consequently do not form constituents. However, there is considerable evidence that NRCs do form grammatical constituents with their antecedents.
As is well known, 'possessive marking' clitic 's appears at the right edge of the NP it marks: (36) exemplifies for NPs with postnominal complements, PP adjuncts, and RRCs. Since the NRC is not a grammatical part of the NP on the RO analysis, its presence should not affect clitic placement, so one might reasonably expect possessive marking to appear after the antecedent and before the NRC (as it would if the NRC was really absent, as in (36)). But this gives the totally unacceptable (37):
(37) *King Alphonso's, who ruined the party, mother left early.
In fact, possessive marking must follow the NRC, exactly as one would expect if the NRC and its antecedent formed an NP constituent: 13 antecedents. . . " She does not attempt to formalise this requirement, or motivate it in any other way, however. Fabb (1990, p65) tries to account for the restriction by suggesting that only the node preceding and immediately adjacent to the relative clause is 'visible' to the interpretation rules that relate the index on the relative pronoun to that on the NP. See Borsley (1992) for problems with Fabb's account.
12 There are also some potentially difficult technical problems with such a stipulation. For example, as Fabb (1990) notes, NRCs can be coordinated as in (i):
(i) I saw Kim, who I like and who always says nice things about me. But under normal assumptions only the first conjunct will be adjacent to the antecedent. Fabb proposes a 'parallel structure' approach to coordination (Goodall, 1987) as a way round the problem. This may be entirely feasible. But it indicates that an RO approach is not simply an optional extra which can be added, cost free, to an existing theory.
13 Examples like (38) look somewhat odd, but sound much better, and the contrast 4.2 (38) King Alphonso -who ruined the party -'s mother left early.
More generally, syntactic operations which have traditionally been analysed as involving movement invariably treat NRCs as though they formed a constituent with their antecedents. The following exemplify with respect to Topicalization, Cleft Formation, Raising, Passive, and Tough-movement. In each case the 'a' example shows result of moving the antecedent and the NRC together, the 'b' example shows the result of moving just the antecedent, 'stranding' the NRC. Again, this is just what a 'syntactically integrated' account would predict. It might seem that an RO approach can deal with this by assuming that the 'right adjacency' constraint applies to 'post movement' structures (outside the syntax, e.g. at PF). But this will be difficult to reconcile with facts about positioning of possessive clitics (if the NRC is to be right adjacent to the antecedent, it should follow, not precede, the clitic), and with a range of phenomena I will consider in the following sections.
between them and examples like (37) is robust. The latter are completely ruled out. One reason why examples like (38) are strange is that they are impossible to punctuate sensibly if the NRC is set off by commas. They look much better if the NRC is put in parenthesis, as in my mother (who used to live in Edinburgh)'s new flat.
4.3

Surface parallels between NRCs and RRCs
In this section I will describe a number of surface structure parallels between NRCs and RRCs. They are important in several ways. In the first place, they are examples of normal syntactic processes involving NRCs, hence prima facie evidence for syntactic integration and against RO. They are, moreover, processes that appear to operate similarly with NRCs and RRCs. This is problematic for an RO approach, which will treat NRCs and RRCs very differently, precluding a unified account. As we have seen in the preceding sections, there are a number of problems which an RO approach might overcome by appeal to some requirement of 'right adjacency' between an NRC and its antecedent. The phenomena discussed in this section will show that no such requirement exists.
Parenthetical Intervention One problem facing a formalisation of 'right adjacency' for NRCs and their antecedents is the possibility of 'normal' parentheticals intervening. Notice it is not possible to evade this problem by claiming that the normal parenthetical is absent at the level of representation where adjacency is defined, because ex hypothesi the NRC must also be absent at such a level.
(44) Some soldiers fled. Horatio, on the contrary, who is always brave, stood his ground. (45) Horatio, my friends, who has never let us down, is the man we should elect.
Of course parentheticals can also appear between a nominal and an RRC, cf. the following NRC/RRC pairs. This is to be expected on an integrated account, where the syntactic structures are very similar.
(46) a. On the bridge we saw Horatio -I think -who cried out defiantly.
[NRC] b. On the bridge we saw a centurion -I think -that cried out defiantly.
(47) a. On the bridge we saw Horatio -tall, brave, in full armourwho cried out defiantly.
[NRC] b. On the bridge we saw a centurion -tall, brave, in full armour -that cried out defiantly.
[RRC] Again, assuming the RRC and the nominal form a constituent, this shows NRCs 'inside', rather than right adjacent to, their antecedents on the surface.
Stacking It has often been claimed that NRCs do not 'stack', so Chomsky (1975) contrasts (55), involving a stack of RRCs with (56) and (57) is given as ungrammatical in Jackendoff (1977):
(55) People who go to MIT who like Math will get good jobs.
[RRC] (56) *John, who goes to MIT, who likes Math, will get a good job.
(57) *Solving this problem will take till doomsday, which is longer than most problems take, which is longer than we've got. [Jackendoff (1977)] If true, this would be evidence for an RO analysis. But it is not true.
The following examples involving stacks of NRCs are grammatical:
(58) I fear the Honourable Member, who nobody trusts, who nobody believes, who not even his own supporters listen to, has finally run out of time. (59) John, who hands in all his work on time, who is on the student council, who even likes Math, for chrissake, will certainly get a good job.
Notice that (59) is broadly parallel to (56). Similarly, consider the putatively ungrammatical (56) in a discourse context where it is a continuation of (55), where it appears acceptable:
(60) In general, people who go to MIT who like Math will get good jobs. For example, I expect John, who goes to MIT, who likes Math, will get a good job. Even the doubtful (65) can be made acceptable if the NRC is made heavier and hence more worthy or being shifted rightwards:
(67) Even John came, who everyone had expected would be too scared of potential publicity.
4.4
Attested examples are relatively easy to find (emphasis added; see the Appendix for more examples):
(68) I was also given a Jubilee mug at school, which I still have. (72) a. There were only thirteen senators present, which number was too few for a quorum. b. *There were only thirteen, which number was too few for a quorum, senators present.
On an integrated account, this will follow from the general principle which, roughly speaking, forbids pre-nominal elements from containing post-head 'phrasal material' -the same principle that accounts for the contrast in (73) (cf. Sadler and Arnold (1994) and references there):
(73) There were two senators more than yesterday present. (74) *There were two more than yesterday senators present.
Of course, no such unified account will be available under an RO analysis.
'Integrated' Phenomena and Processes
Under an RO approach there are no syntactic relations (e.g. command) between an NRC at its host clause, and no grammatical processes should involve the NRC and the host. In this section, I will present evidence that this is incorrect. Again, the processes and restrictions will be ones which seem to work in the same way in NRCs and RRCs.
4.4
Constraints on Antecedent-Anaphor Relations At least some constraints on Antecedent-Anaphor Relations which involve command are similar in NRCs and RRCs. For example, there is a familiar restriction on the relation between an anaphor and its antecedent, which can be stated descriptively as 'an anaphor may not both precede and command its antecedent'. The effect of this can be seen in (75). In (75a) the anaphor follows the antecedent. In (75b) it precedes the antecedent, but does not command it. However, in (75b) it both precedes and commands, and the result is ungrammatical. (75) 
Assuming VPE to an operation on grammatical structures (e.g. LFs), data like (78a) and (78b) is entirely unexpected, because no grammatical process should be able access an NRC and an RRC at the same time.
Right-Node-Raising Roughly speaking, Right-Node-Raising (RNR) involves a 'raised' constituent that appears to have moved rightward in the main clause, associated with 'gap' positions in each conjunct of a coordinate structure. In (79) Quantified NP Antecedents, Bound Anaphora Following Ross (1967) , it has often claimed that, in contrast with RRCs, NRCs cannot have Quantified NPs (QNPs) as their antecedents, and cannot contain pronouns bound by external QNPs. Again, it this were true, it would be evidence for an RO analysis -for example, if NRCs are orphans, quantifiers in the host clause will not command, and hence not be able to bind, either the relative pronoun or any other pronoun in the NRC.
The basis of this claim is examples like the following (based on examples from Ross (1967) ):
(82) a. Every plane which has an engine in its tail is a failure. b. *Every plane, which has an engine in its tail, is a failure.
(83) a. No plane which has an engine in its tail is a failure. b. *No plane, which has an engine in its tail, is a failure.
Unfortunately, there are many counter-examples (first pointed out by Sells (1985 Sells ( , 1986 , see also Kempson (2003) ; notice that (84c) involves both a quantified antecedent and a bound pronoun inside the NRC).
(84) a. Every chess set comes with a spare pawn, which you will find taped to the top of the box. (Sells, 1985) b. Every new student is assigned a tutor, who is responsible for the student's well-being in college. c. A tutor will be assigned to each student, who is then responsible for getting his papers to the Dean's office on time. (Sells, 1986 ) d. Every American film producer pays the lead actress, who hates his guts, a fortune. (Kamp and Reyle, 1993, p255) These examples involve universals, and it has sometimes been suggested there is a weaker restriction on kinds of QNP that can antecede NRCs (e.g. that only QNPs with 'counting' quantifiers, or non-negative quantifiers are allowed (Kempson, 2003) ). But even this weaker claim is false. The following exemplify with a variety of quantified antecedents (including, notably, the negative quantifier no).
(85) a. No properly trained linguist, who would have been taught phonetics as part of her training, would have made that mistake. b. Any properly trained linguist, who would have been taught phonetics as part of her training, would have seen that mistake. c. All/Many/Most/Several/Few/Less that one in ten properly trained linguists, who would have been taught phonetics as part of their training, would have made that mistake.
There is in fact no simple restriction on the kind of QNP that can antecede an NRC (though, as will appear, QNP antecedents are not always possible). Indeed, making examples like (82b) acceptable seems to be a matter of manipulating the content of the NRC (partly to make it more plausible; notice again, that these involve both a quantificational antecedent and an 'externally bound' pronoun in the NRC):
(86) Every modern plane, which may or may not have an engine in its tail, is prone to this sort of problem.
(87) No modern plane, which may or may not have an engine in its tail, is prone to this sort of problem.
It seems clear that NRC can stand in a scopal relation to their antecedents. Of course, this poses a fundamental problem for any RO approach that tries to deal with scope and variable binding at any conventional grammatical level of representation.
However, these data are also indicative of a more general and more puzzling issue, because they not only show NRCs having a scope relation to their antecedents, they show them taking narrow scope. This is problematic, because as we have seen in Section 2 there is considerable evidence that NRCs typically take wide scope. In the following section, I will sketch a syntactically integrated approach to NRCs that provides a solution to this 'scope paradox'.
A Syntactically Integrated Alternative
The preceding section has presented a considerable number and variety of phenomena that appear problematic for an RO analysis of NRCs. But problematic phenomena, however extensive, do not defeat analyses. Alternative analyses are required. In this section I will briefly sketch a 'syntactically integrated' approach to NRCs, which is not subject to the problems set out in the previous section, and which even deal straightforwardly with the 'scope paradox' mentioned at the end of the previous section.
15
There are three key ideas (two of which are just the 'plausible and relatively uncontroversial assumptions' which were used in Section 2 to make sense of the basic facts about NRCs):
• NRCs are syntactically like RRCs (i.e. they are syntactically integrated).
15 A formalisation of the approach, couched in terms of Head-Driven Phrase Structure Grammar (Pollard and Sag, 1994) and 'Underspecified Discourse Representation Theory (Reyle, 1993; Frank and Reyle, 1995) , can be found in Arnold (2004) .
• NRCs are interpreted like independent sentences -non-compositionally (i.e. they are not semantically integrated).
• In NRCs, relative pronouns are treated as normal anaphoric pronouns.
As regards the syntax, the reader should simply take their favourite analysis of RRCs and assign the same structures to NRCs.
16 For example, Sag (1997)'s detailed and comprehensive analysis English RRCs assigns structures like (88).
is speaking at the conference Precisely the same syntactic rules can be used for NRCs, producing structures like (89):
Kim
S nrc P P P P , who I detest,
is speaking at the conference Given this, we have an immediate explanation of the similarities between NRCs and RRCs that have been pointed out above. In particular, the facts about constituency follow immediately, e.g. that movement processes treat NRCs and their antecedents as constituents, that possessive 's attaches after NRCs, that NRCs and RRCs can be conjoined. Because the same rules and principles operate on NRCs and RRCs, We correctly predict that NRCs should 'stack', and that RNR will be able to operate on NRCs and RRCs in the same way. We have a straightforward account of the ways in which NRCs can be separated from their antecedents (the same processes, e.g. extraposition and Heavy-NP-Shift, that separate RRCs from their head nouns can separate NRCs from their antecedents).
As regards the semantics, the reader should use their favourite treatment of anaphoric pronouns and non-compositional phenomena (or, lacking that, some other approach to 'wide scope' phenomena). For the purpose of exposition, an account using couched in Discourse Representation Theory (DRT) (Kamp and Reyle, 1993) is particularly straightforward -to say that relative pronouns are treated anaphorically is just to say that they introduce a discourse variable, and saying that NRCs are interpreted as independent sentences just means that their content goes into the topmost Discourse Representation Structure (DRS), like other 'wide scope' items (e.g. proper names, indexicals). This means the representation of (90) will be along the lines of (91).
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(90) Kim k thinks Sam s , who w is really witty, entirely lacks a sense of humour.
w ≈ s witty(w)
In words, there are individuals k, s, and w, k thinks s lacks a sense of humour, w is witty, and w is referentially dependent on s ('referential dependence' includes, but is not limited to, co-reference). The points to notice are that the relative pronoun has been treated as a pronoun (cf. the discourse variable w and the condition w ≈ s), and that the content of the NRC (e.g. the condition witty(w)) has gone into the 'top box'. This is essentially the same representation as would be assigned to (92):
(92) Kim k thinks Sam s entirely lacks a sense of humour. She w is really witty.
We have here the basis of a formal account of the many of the properties described in Section 2. If the content of an NRC which is inside a VP goes into the 'top box', it will not be part of the content of that VP, so it is not surprising that it should be invisible to the process that interprets VP-Ellipsis (cf. (14b)). If NRCs are treated as independent sentences, then, like any independent sentence, they are expected to have their own illocutionary force (cf. (20)- (22)), and are expected be able to bear discourse relations (like 'consequence') to other sentences, including their host sentences (cf. (23b)). In English, independent sentences are normally finite -hence the exclusion of non-finite relative clauses as NRCs (cf. (7)).
18 If NRPs are treated as normal anaphoric pronouns, we account straightforwardly for their inability to take idiom-parts as antecedents (cf. (11)), for the wide range of possible antecedents (cf. (9)), and the possibilities of split and 'constructed' antecedents (cf. (10a)-(10d)).
Taking both assumptions together, we have an account of their behaviour with respect to 'contrast sets' (cf. (13)). We also have a plausible explanation for why the relative pronoun is obligatory in NRCs: the relative pronoun is required to establish the anaphoric link to the antecedent, just as a normal pronoun is required in independent sentences (since English lacks any appropriate null-anaphor).
Moreover, as (91) shows, putting the content of the NRC into the 'top box', accounts for the way it is interpreted as being outside the scope of a propositional verb (cf. (19) ). In the same way, the content of an NRC will also escape the scope of sentence negation and other NPI licensors, predicting that it will not be able to contain the focus of external negation (cf. (15)), or externally licensed NPIs (cf. (24a)-(25b)). We can also explain the contrast in (93): (93) a. Sam owns a car, which is dented.
b. *Sam doesn't own a car, which is dented.
As one would expect, the explanation is the same as the explanation for 18 Footnote 4 noted the possible existence of some non-finite NRCs. Notice that their existence is not problematic for this approach, since they are non-finites that can act as independent sentences (e.g. they have their own illocutionary force).
the contrast in (94). The associated DRSs are (95), for (93a) and (94a), and (96), for (93b) and (94b).
(94) a. Sam owns a car. It is dented.
b. *Sam doesn't own a car. It is dented.
The DRS in (95) is unproblematic, but (96) is ill-formed (in DRT terms, it is improper ). There is a general constraint on DRSs conditions, including conditions of the form w ≈ c, that the discourse variables they contain must appear in an accessible DRS. A DRS where this constraint is not satisfied is said to be improper. Roughly, every DRS is accessible from itself, the antecedent of a conditional is accessible from the consequent, and a larger, containing DRS is accessible from a smaller, contained one (but not vice versa). Since the discourse variable c does not appear in the top box, but in the sub-DRS in the scope of negation, it is not accessible to the condition w ≈ c. Hence (96) is improper.
However, there are a several properties of NRCs that we have not yet accounted for.
For one thing, the principles that explain the ungrammaticality of (93b) predict that it should never be possible to attach an NRC to an indefinite in the scope of negation. But this is not the case. For example, (97) has essentially the same structure as (93b), and should also be ungrammatical, but it is fine: (97) Sam doesn't own a car, which she wouldn't be able to drive (any-way).
Moreover, putting NRCs into the top box gives them wide scope. But how can this be compatible with them having narrow scope, as the examples in Section 4 involving QNP antecedents seem to require? In fact, as so far presented, the approach seems to suggest that NRCs should not be able to take QNP antecedents -for the same reason that QNPs cannot bind pronouns across sentence boundaries (cf. e.g. Heim (1982) 's 'Scope Constraint'). That is, the examples we saw in Section 4 of NRCs attached to QNPs should be bad in the same way as examples of cross-sentential variable binding like the following (which also involve inaccessible antecedents, and hence improper DRSs).
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(98) a. *No female politician will support this proposal. She will be vilified in the press. b. *Every female politician will support this proposal. She knows that the press adore her.
In fact, the solution to these problems is relatively straightforward, and indeed consistent with approach to the semantics of NRCs. However, before presenting it, it is worth pointing out that the 'scope paradox' noted at the end of Section 4 is actually worse than suggested there. As first pointed out in Arnold (2004) , not only do NRCs show both wide and narrow scope properties, they can show them at the same time. Consider (99).
(99) No properly trained linguist, who would have (*ever) been taught phonetics as part of her training, would have made that mistake.
Notice that the NPI ever is not allowed in the NRC in this example, consistent with NRC being outside the scope of the negative quantifier no linguist. Equally, however, the example involves her being bound by no linguist, suggesting the NRC is simultaneously within the scope of the negative quantifier.
20
19 Many speakers find examples like these marginal, rather than entirely bad, partly because very small changes (e.g. to the tense of one of the verbs) can make the acceptable. This is explicable in terms of the operation of the accommodation process to be described directly. Such readers are urged to accept the indicated judgements at face value for the sake of discussion.
20 The NPI is of course possible in an RRC, witness: (i) No properly trained linguist that had (ever) been taught phonetics as part of her training would have made that mistake.
The solution to these problems begins with the observation that crosssentential binding is not always impossible (cf Roberts, 1989 Roberts, , 1996 . Compare (97a,b) with (100a,b), which show it occurring.
(100) a. No female politician will support this proposal. She would be vilified in the press. b. Every female politician should support this proposal. She should realize that the press will adore her.
According to Roberts, examples like these involve an accommodation process, which she calls 'telescoping' or 'modal subordination'. Precisely what circumstances trigger this process remains somewhat unclear, except that it has something to do with indicators of 'discourse continuity' -signalling that the second sentence is intended to be interpreted relative to assumptions that can be derived from the previous context (for example, the irrealis tense in (100a) indicates a continuation relative to the assumption that a female politician does support the proposal; cf. Roberts (1989 Roberts ( , 1996 ; Poesio and Zucchi (1992) ; Kadmon (2001) for more relevant discussion). Fortunately, this is not critical here: for our purposes what matters is that the process seems to operate in a similar way with NRCs -which is of course what this approach NRCs would lead one to expect.
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Consider examples (97) and (93b), repeated here as (101a,b).
(101) a. *Sam doesn't own a car, which is dented. b. Sam doesn't own a car, which she wouldn't be able to drive anyway.
Notice that the same pattern can be seen in examples involving crosssentential binding, such as (102a,b).
(102) a. *Sam doesn't own a car. It is dented. b. Sam doesn't own a car. She wouldn't be able to drive it anyway.
In each case, the use of irrealis tense in the 'b' example makes the indicated binding licit. Under the account of modal subordination presented in Poesio and Zucchi (1992) , this works as follows. Initially the 'b' examples receive a representation like (103). This is parallel to the 21 The insight about the parallelism between NRCs and cross-sentential binding with respect to modal subordination is due to Sells (1985 Sells ( , 1986 , but his approach is rather different from what is described here. Sells idea seems to have been to allow NRCs to have wide scope in some contexts and narrow scope in others. This provides no way to capture the mixtures of wide and narrow scope discussed here. However, in the 'b' examples, the irrealis tense signals the appropriate form of discourse continuity, and triggers accommodation. What this means is that the content of the NRC (or the second sentence in (102a)) is placed in the consequent of a conditional whose antecedent can be thought of as a kind of anaphoric pronoun which, like any normal pronoun, must be resolved (i.e. associated with content from elsewhere in the discourse, cf. the condition χ ≈??). There are several resolutions for χ that are consistent with accommodating the content of the NRC in (101b) or the second clause in (102b). The two most obvious are (105) and (106), corresponding roughly to a car that she (Sam) owns and a car, respectively:
22 The original idea of treating accommodation as a kind of anaphoric process is due to van der Sandt (1992) .
Either choice leads to a proper DRS. If (106) is chosen, the result is equivalent to (107), where the DRS in (106) has replaced χ . Notice that the antecedent of the conditional contains a discourse variable which is accessible to the problematic condition 'w ≈ c', so the whole DRS is 'proper'. Either choice yields the right sort of semantics. Roughly speaking (107) will be true in any situation where Sam doesn't own a car, and where in every situation that includes a car c, she (Sam) would not be able to drive c). If χ is resolved as in (105) the interpretation is the same except that Sam's inability is restricted to cars that she owns, rather than cars in general. We now not only have an account of why (97) is grammatical, and what it means, we can also explain how NRCs can simultaneously take wide scope and be anteceded by (hence in the scope of) QNPs. Essentially, NRCs always take wide scope, but they can under certain circumstances have their content put in the consequent of a conditional whose antecedent contains semantic material 'accommodated' from elsewhere. This will make it appear that they are in the scope of that material.
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23 Notice that though this treatment has some similarity with an approach that treats non-restrictive relative pronouns as E-type pronouns (Gobbo, 2003, e.g.) , it is not an E-type analysis in any straightforward way. The typical use of an E-type pronoun is to pick out the (unique) entity or set of entities that satisfy some earlier This give a straightforward account of 'paradoxical' examples like (99) (repeated here).
(108) No properly trained linguist, who would have (*ever) been taught phonetics as part of her training, would have made that mistake.
As usual, the content of the NRC goes into the top box, which puts it outside the scope of the negative quantifier. Hence the NPI ever is excluded. However, accommodation can occur, introducing a conditional χ ⇒ NRC', where NRC' is the content of the NRC. If χ is resolved to something like 'x such that x is properly trained and a linguist', the DRS that results will be along the lines of (109). The truth conditions of this involve there being a mistake m, such that there is no x, where x is a linguist such that x would make m; and in every situation if x is a linguist x would have been taught phonetics. Again, these seem to be the correct truth conditions. This explanation is parallel to that which would be given for an example of cross sentential binding, such as (110). Notice that here too accommodation seems to be able to provide an antecedent for a pronoun, but not a negative operator to license an NPI.
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(110) No properly trained linguist would have made that mistake. She would have (*ever) been taught phonetics as part of her training.
description. For example, in Few congressmen voted for Kennedy (and) they were very junior, the referent of they is the (unique, small) set of congressmen who voted for Kennedy. On a straightforward E-type analysis examples like (101b) should be saying something about Kim's inability to drive the/a (unique) car that she does not own. In fact, as the analysis here predicts, they are about all cars (or all cars she owns).
Similarly, E-type pronouns cannot have antecedents with no, cf. *No congressmen voted for Kennedy (and) they were very junior. So an E-type analysis would predict that NRCs should be similarly impossible. But they are not -see (99)/(108). 24 Notice that I am not offering an explanation for why this particular content Notice, finally, that this treatment of NRCs is, from a theoretical point of view, 'cost free' in that does not involve any apparatus which is not independently required: the syntactic apparatus is required independently for RRCs, the machinery for giving NRCs wide scope is needed independently for proper names and indexicals; the accommodation apparatus is needed for the treatment of ordinary pronouns.
Conclusion
In this paper I have argued that the initial appeal of the RO approach to NRCs is illusory. In particular, there is a large and varied body of evidence that is problematic for such an approach, and which is consistent with NRCs having an 'integrated' syntax, similar to RRCs. In the final section I have sketched how such an alternative, integrated, approach can also explain the main properties of NRCs, in particular, the differences between NRCs and RRCs. This account uses only existing, indeis chosen for accommodation in these case -I merely claim that it is similar in both cases, so that an explanation of the way accommodation works in the case of normal pronouns will be an explanation of the way it works with NRCs. Notice also that I am not claiming that examples involving NRCs and parallel examples with independent sentences are always equivalent. For one thing, an NRC can introduce material for a subsequent anaphor in the matrix, which will preclude a paraphrase with an independent sentence. Compare:
(i) Sam, who had borrowed my copy of Aspects i , returned it i today.
(ii) *Sam returned it i today. She had borrowed my copy of Aspects i . Grosu (2002) observes the following, suggesting that while the accommodation possibilities for NRCs and normal discourse anaphora may be similar, they are not identical:
(iii) At the party I saw few students. They were probably at home studying for the exam.
(iv) ??At the party I saw few students, who were probably at home studying for the exam. Here, ordinary discourse anaphora seems to be able to pick up the complement of a set introduced by previous discourse (the previous discourse has introduced 'the students at the party', the referent of they in (iii) is the students who were not at the party). I am not entirely sure I share Grosu's judgements here, but in any case, accommodation is an inference process, and it is entirely possible that the inferential possibilities are different in the case of independent sentences and syntactically subordinate clauses. Moreover, making the antecedent more specific and the NRC more conditional improves things in cases like (v), so the following is certainly better:
(v) At the party I saw very few linguistics students, who would mostly have been too busy studying for the exam.
